By: Kyle Alander

The quest to union with God is celebrated as “theosis” in Eastern Orthodox Christianity and “deification” in Roman Catholicism.  To illuminate this mystical process and address the often-misunderstood reverence for Mary within Catholic and Orthodox traditions, we turn to a compelling allegory drawn from “The Legend of Korra.” In this narrative, the fusion of Wan, a mortal, with Raava, a divine spirit, mirrors the transformative journey towards divinity and sheds light on Mary’s unique veneration. This analogy not only elucidates the potential for human transcendence but also aims to bridge understanding, particularly among Protestants, regarding the high regard in which Mary is held. Through this exploration, we delve into the nuances of spiritual growth in Christian theology and the special status of Mary, hoping to clarify her role and veneration using a relatable and enlightening allegory.

The Fusion of Wan and Raava: A Symbol of Transformation

In “The Legend of Korra,” the story of Wan and Raava presents a vivid illustration of the transformative potential inherent in union with the divine. Wan, a mere mortal, embarks on a journey of growth and discovery that leads him to a pivotal moment of fusion with Raava, a spirit of light and peace. This union transcends Wan’s human limitations, endowing him with remarkable abilities and the responsibility of being the Avatar, a bridge between the human and spiritual realms.

Parallels with Theosis and Deification:

This narrative mirrors the spiritual journey of theosis or deification, where the believer, through grace, virtue, and the sacraments, enters into a closer union with the Divine. Just as Wan’s fusion with Raava does not erase his humanity but elevates it, theosis and deification do not make the believer divine in essence but sanctify their nature to reflect divine attributes more fully.

The Dynamic of Transformation:

The transformation experienced by Wan is not instantaneous but the culmination of a journey marked by trials, learning, and growth. Similarly, theosis and deification are processes of spiritual evolution, where the believer’s character and actions are progressively aligned with divine qualities such as love, wisdom, and holiness. This journey is marked by a synergetic relationship between divine grace and human effort, where each step forward is both a gift and a personal commitment to growth.

The Distinction in Union:

It’s crucial to note that while Wan becomes the Avatar, he does not become Raava in essence, nor does Raava lose her distinct identity or become Wans essence. This distinction parallels the theological nuance in theosis and deification, where the believer partakes in the divine nature without becoming God in essence. The union enhances and transforms the believer’s capabilities and understanding, much like Wan’s abilities are expanded, yet the fundamental distinction between the Creator and the creation is maintained.

The analogy of Wan’s fusion with Raava from “The Legend of Korra” offers an understandable narrative to understand the complex and mystical journey of becoming more like the Divine as outlined in Christian theology. It highlights the transformative potential of divine-human union, the gradual nature of spiritual growth, and the maintenance of essential distinctions, providing a captivating entry point into the exploration of theosis and deification.

Mary’s Unique Journey and Veneration Distinctions

Building on the analogy from “The Legend of Korra,” where Wan’s transformation through fusion with Raava symbolizes the spiritual journey towards theosis or deification, we can further explore this transformative theme by applying it to the unique status and veneration of Mary in Christian tradition. Mary’s role as the Theotokos, or God-bearer, presents a singular example of divine-human cooperation and highlights the nuances of veneration within the Christian faith.

Mary: The Ultimate Model of Union:

In Christian theology, Mary represents the epitome of synergy between human willingness and divine grace. Her fiat, or “yes” to God’s plan, marks the beginning of a profound union with the divine, culminating in the Incarnation. Analogous to Raava’s choice to fuse with Wan, Mary’s acceptance brings about a unique intersection of the human and divine. However, unlike the fusion that creates the Avatar, Mary’s union with the divine does not endow her with divine essence but makes her the vessel through which God enters the world in human form.

Distinctions in Veneration: Understanding Mary’s Place

The reverence for Mary within Christianity, especially in Catholic and Orthodox traditions, is deeply rooted in her unique role in salvation history. Drawing from the earlier analogy, just as Wan’s transformation and new role are recognized and respected, Mary is honored in a special way, reflected in the concept of hyperdulia. This level of veneration is distinct from latria, the worship due to God alone, and dulia, the reverence given to saints and holy figures.

– Hyperdulia: Reserved solely for Mary, hyperdulia acknowledges her unparalleled cooperation with divine grace and her role as the Mother of God. This form of veneration is akin to recognizing Wan’s unique status as the Avatar, though the analogy falls short of fully encapsulating Mary’s singular position in Christian devotion.

– Dulia: The respect and honor given to the saints, akin to how other significant but not Avatar-level figures in “The Legend of Korra” might be esteemed. These figures are celebrated for their virtues and deeds, serving as models of faith.

– Latria: This is the worship that is directed exclusively towards God, paralleled by the ultimate reverence shown to the spirit of Raava before her fusion with Wan. Despite Wan’s elevated status post-fusion, the reverence due to Raava (representing the divine) remains of a fundamentally different order.

Mary’s Transformative Example:

Mary’s journey reflects the highest potential for human cooperation with divine grace, embodying the profound potential within each believer to respond to God’s call with faith and humility. Her “yes” to God, though simple, reverberates through time as the ultimate act of human participation in God’s salvific plan. This act of consent did not elevate Mary to a divine status but positioned her as a pivotal figure in the history of salvation, through which the divine and human natures were united in the person of Jesus Christ.

Mary’s unique role and the subsequent veneration she receives underscore the multifaceted nature of Christian piety. Her journey exemplifies the pinnacle of human cooperation with divine will, making her an unparalleled figure of reverence within the Christian tradition. The special veneration of hyperdulia accorded to Mary does not detract from the worship due to God (latria) but enriches the tapestry of Christian devotion by highlighting the role of human willingness in the divine plan.

The Role of Mary as a Model for Believers:

In the same way that Wan’s story in “The Legend of Korra” serves as a narrative of transformation and responsibility, Mary’s story inspires believers to open their hearts to God’s grace. She exemplifies the transformative power of divine grace when met with human openness and consent. Mary’s journey invites believers to contemplate their own capacity for cooperation with God’s grace and to aspire towards such a profound union with the divine will.

The distinctions of dulia, hyperdulia, and latria within Christian veneration serve not only as theological categories but as expressions of the manifold ways divine grace operates within creation. Mary, through her unique role and the exceptional veneration she receives, stands as a testament to the extraordinary works of grace in human history. Her elevation through hyperdulia reflects the awe and reverence inspired by God’s action in her life, an action that remains unparalleled but invites emulation in its openness to divine will.

The Harmony of Divine Grace and Human Response:

The journey of Mary, from her fiat to her unique role in salvation history, encapsulates the beautiful synergy between divine grace and human cooperation. The analogy of Wan and Raava, drawn from “The Legend of Korra,” while a narrative from a different context, serves to illustrate this profound relationship in an accessible and engaging manner. Through this lens, we see the transformative potential that lies in the union between the divine and the human, a theme central to both the animated series and Christian theology.

Mary’s response to God’s call, characterized by humility and profound faith, sets a precedent for believers. It demonstrates that divine grace, when met with a willing human heart, can bring about extraordinary outcomes in the fabric of salvation history. This dynamic interplay between divine initiative and human cooperation is a cornerstone of Christian understanding of sanctity and the journey towards holiness.

In venerating Mary, Christians do not merely honor a historical figure but recognize and celebrate the transformative power of divine grace manifested in human life. The veneration accorded to Mary, especially in the form of hyperdulia, goes beyond mere admiration. It is a recognition of her unique cooperation with God’s grace, making her a model for all who seek to respond to God’s call with a willing and open heart.

Furthermore, this veneration serves as a reminder of the dignity and potential of every human being to partake in God’s salvific plan. Just as Mary played a pivotal role in the Incarnation, each believer is called to participate in the ongoing story of salvation through their lives and actions, inspired by her example.

The harmony of divine grace and human response, exemplified in Mary’s life, invites a deeper reflection on the nature of sanctity and the call to holiness that lies at the heart of Christian life. It challenges believers to consider their own openness to God’s grace and their willingness to cooperate with divine will, aspiring to reflect the divine in their own lives.

In conclusion, the journey of Mary, illuminated through the distinctions of veneration within Christian tradition, offers a rich tapestry of themes for contemplation. Her story, marked by a profound union with the divine, exemplifies the potential for human beings to transcend their limitations through cooperation with divine grace. This narrative, rooted in the Christian faith and paralleled in the transformative journey of Wan and Raava, invites believers to a deeper engagement with the divine mystery, encouraging a life of faith, humility, and active participation in God’s redemptive work in the world.

Note: This essay was originally written for my Philosophy of Mind course. In my research in formal epistemology I have accepted a form of epistemic falliblism which is termed “radical probabilism” in the literature.

One argument against this form of fallibilism is from Descartes argument on the infallibility of the cogito ergo sum. In this paper I challenge his argument in detail

By: Kyle Alander

Rene Descartes argues we have infallible knowledge of our mental states, his argument is based on the infallibility of cogito ergo sum (I Think, Therefore, I Am), this is known as introspectionism. However, introspectionism has been recently challenged by Nisbett, De Camp Wilson & Schwitzgebel. They argue through a set of experiments that introspection is unreliable and so fallible, their position is anti-introspectionism. I will reinforce their conclusions by adding an additional problem for Descartes’ position. Descartes’ account of the infallibility of cogito ergo sum relies on two background assumptions, the first assumption is us having infallible knowledge about logic, and the second assumption is a specific account of incorrigible doubt. I will argue that on philosophical grounds these two assumptions are wrong and so it would lead to a fallibilism about the contents of our minds making at least some form of anti-introspectionism as true.


Exposition:

Descartes’s introspectionism says that we can have infallible knowledge of our mental states. This mental infallibility entails that we cannot be mistaken about our mental states, the mental states include our beliefs, reasons, and other mental stuff in our minds. He also believes that he has special introspective access to his mental states. His main argument is that an evil demon can deceive him about his external world sense perceptions but cannot deceive him about his mental thinking, this is from his famous “I Think, Therefore, I Am” statement.

Nisbett and De Camp Wilson disagree with Descartes and so hold to anti-introspectionism, their thesis is based on a set of experiments that show that people cannot accurately report on what is the mental stuff in their minds, rather when people report they are reliant on a priori theory about what they are thinking rather than the mental items themselves. An a priori theory is a theory or narrative that is in your head regarding your identity and mental contents. So we can only report accurately when we have a theory about our mind and its contents rather than the mind and contents of the mind itself. For example, when the subjects are asked to write speeches that go against their own views they will later adopt the contrary view and then revise the history of their beliefs to state that they believed the contrary view the whole time. So this would be an example of people reporting not on what is actually in their minds but what they theorized was in their mind

Schwitzgebel adopts another form of anti-introspectionism, he claims that while introspection is very important to our everyday life it is unreliable in telling us what is going on inside our heads. He bases this on the notion that we can ask questions about the contents of our mind and not be certain about it. He uses the example of our emotions and sensory experiences and how we can misjudge these mental states. Like when we feel joy or anger these can often be conflated, and we often don’t understand why we are joyful or angry much of the time. So the very fact that we can question our own emotions of introspection is evidence for a kind of anti-introspectionism.

Critical Evaluation:

I will argue that on philosophical grounds that we do not have infallible knowledge about logic and that Descartes specific account of incorrigible doubt is wrong. If either of my arguments succeeds then it would lead to a fallibilism about the contents of our minds making at least some form of anti-introspectionism as true.

First, we can deny the underlying logic of Descartes’s argument by the following thought experiment: the evil demon can deceive us about modus ponens. Modus ponens is the logical statement: if P then Q, P, Therefore Q. It could be the case that we are simply wrong about modus ponens because anytime we do the logic the demon steps in to make us have a false belief. However for the cogito ergo sum to work we must assume that modus ponens works and not be possibly wrong about it.

An objection defending Descartes is that even an omnipotent demon cannot change logic and so cannot deceive us about it. However this misses the point of the problem since I am not making an ontological claim about the ability of a demon to change logic, I can grant that it cannot do that. Instead, I am making an epistemological claim: we could be deceived about our understanding or knowledge of logic. So my objection to Descartes does not rest on the ability of the demon to change logic it only rests on the ability of the demon to mess with our knowledge about logic.  Thus Descartes’s demon could deceive us about the very foundations of logic, making us doubt the logic behind the cogito ergo sum.

Second, we can question Descartes account of incorrigible doubts. Consider this thought experiment: let’s say that I am sitting on my armchair, engaging in philosophical thought. I experience sensation Z containing the thought “I am doubting”, and then there is sensation Y which contains the thought “I am hungry”. So when I experience Z I form the belief “I am doubting”, but then one day I get sensation Z and form the belief “I am hungry” or more critically I form the sensation Y (something that is supposed to be my hunger) and form the belief “I am doubting”. We are left with a problem, I was mistaken in that instance since the sensation Y contains something incorrect.

An objection to this thought experiment is that even if we have a sensation Y and not Z, we are still in fact doubting since doubting implies thinking and so we can still have infallible knowledge about thinking and doubting.

However, this objection doesn’t work. The challenge for the cartesian is how we get to the knowing we are thinking and doubting. We can’t know we are thinking and doubting based on something false as knowledge requires we had the correct chain of justification all along, it is not merely about getting to the truth. Another way to put it is that if we are in a state such that we form the belief we are doubting based on false sensations, then we cannot know we are doubting as our belief is not rightly connected to our sensation, we simply got ‘lucky’ that we got to the correct belief that we are doubting, but our justification is flawed and so isn’t sufficient for knowledge. This is a serious problem for Descartes account of incorrigible doubt since his views rely on the assumption that the justification regarding the doubt is itself through a correct chain of justification. But there is an in-principle way where we can be wrong about our sensations about our doubts. Since there is an in principle way for us to be wrong about our doubts this reinforces the conclusion that Descartes’ account of incorrigible doubts is mistaken.

These considerations make both of Descartes views wrong. I have shown that us having infallible knowledge about logic and Descartes specific account of incorrigible doubt are both mistaken. Therefore since those assumptions are false it leads to a fallibilism about the contents of our minds making at least some form of anti-introspectionism as true.

This is a guest post by David Pallmann in response to a recent article titled ‘A Declaration of War on Young Apologetics‘. The content in this blog post is therefore representative of his views and may not necessarily be shared by all those who consider themselves to be youth apologist. To see the blog owners perspective (Kyle Alander) see this critical review

By: David Pallmann

Not long ago, an article entitled “A Declaration of War on Young Apologists” began circulating online which constituted a not-so-subtle rebuke of myself among others. The article designates these individuals as “young apologists.” The article was motivated by certain criticisms which these individuals have raised against contemporary popular Christian apologetics. The moniker “young apologist” is, of course, problematic since most young people who engage in apologetics do not typically criticize popular apologetics. I think it probably would have been better to just address me (or whoever else the authors of this article had in mind) by name. This would save us the trouble of seeking a better label for the group of individuals in question. For the sake of simplicity, I will accept the label “young apologist” throughout this article, but under duress.

I also find it unhelpful to designate this disagreement as a “war.” Ironically, as we shall see, this designation seems to make the authors of this article guilty of the very thing which they criticize the “young apologists” for doing – namely creating infighting within the apologetics community. Rather than violently fighting about our disagreements, I propose that we have a civil conversation about the disagreement.

The article was written by Chris Stockman and Will Hess and was published on Hess’ blog The Church Split which is affiliated with his podcast of the same name. One must note the irony in Hess’ involvement in and publication of this article inasmuch as one of the stated objectives of his ministry to “challenge the status quo.” That is the very thing which the “young apologists” are attempting to do with respect to popular apologetics. And yet, a running theme throughout the article is that they ought not do this! Challenging the status quo is (apparently) only okay when Hess disagrees with it. Double standards along with misunderstandings, as we shall see, are a recurring problem throughout this article.

Stockman and Hess are both friends of mine. Hess, in particular, I love like a brother. This article is written with a deep appreciation for both of them no matter how harsh it sounds at times. I want to take their concerns seriously, offer clarification where it is appropriate, and offer criticisms of their arguments and objections when necessary. My hope is that, if nothing else, this will at least bring some much-needed clarity to the disagreement even if it doesn’t resolve it. Although I am acting as a spokesperson for the diverse group of individuals who have been labeled “young apologists” I will be offering my own unique perspective. So what I say here may not always reflect the sentiments of all “young apologists” on every issue raised by the article.

Lack of Clarity

In the introductory paragraph, Stockman introduces the issue and then puts forward what I take to be the thesis statement of the article: “They [young apologists] are bright, but are doing more harm than good at the moment.” Now this is immediately an extremely vague thesis. What sort of harm? Harm to the cause of Christ? Harm to the apologetic enterprise? Harm to the fragile ego of certain popular apologists? It’s just not clear what sort of harm we are supposed to be doing. As such, it becomes difficult to see how the thesis statement is supported by the following discussion.

Stockman proceeds to explain how some of us are critical of certain popular apologetic arguments. The problems with this, according to him, are “1) some of them do this far too often, and 2) some of them, if you didn’t know them from Adam, would be confused for the village atheist with what their critiques are as well as how incessant they are.” So regarding 1, how often is too often? It’s like Stockman is okay with some criticisms of popular apologetic arguments, but not too much. So what’s the cut-off point? And how can it be justified in a non-arbitrary way? Needless to say, Stockman doesn’t tell us. Charitably he might be interpreted as saying that “young apologists” critique popular apologetics more than they build a positive case for Christianity. I would agree that, if this is what we are doing, then this is a problem since the apologist’s primary task is to defend the faith. But under this interpretation, the objection simply doesn’t apply to most of the people who Stockman clearly has in mind.

Regarding the second point, it seems to me that a degree of confusion is inevitable whenever one is criticizing common arguments used to support some position. For example, I have been accused of being a Calvinist for objecting to the use of certain arguments against Calvinism. I have been accused of being an evolutionist for objecting to the use of certain arguments for a young earth. I have been accused of being a determinist for objecting to the use of certain arguments for free will. Yet I affirm neither Calvinism, nor evolution, nor determinism.

Those who are untrained in philosophy have an unfortunate tendency to confuse the rejection of some argument for a proposition with a rejection of the proposition itself. But that is an a invalid inference, and the proper solution is to remind people that one can accept a proposition while rejecting certain arguments for it. The solution is most certainly not to avoid objecting to bad arguments lest someone make an invalid inference to the conclusion that you reject the proposition which the bad arguments are supposed to support. We simply don’t have to cater to people’s irrationality. And Stockman has given no argument to the contrary.

Double Standards

Stockman says “Here, I am not saying not to criticize wrong ideas. Of course, if an apologist like Frank Turek or Michael Licona is incorrect on something, it should be (graciously) pointed out. But, by who? Twenty-something’s with YouTube channels that nobody watches?” Observe that the grievance here is not the criticizing of poor arguments. That is explicitly said to be okay. The problem, according to Stockman, lies with who is doing the criticizing. Why are “young apologists” not supposed to be criticizing bad apologetics according to Stockman? He gives two reasons: 1) their age, and 2) the size of their following. 

Aside from being an obvious ad hominem, Stockman seems to have a double standard here. Presumably he doesn’t think that one’s age or the size of their following is relevant when it comes to pointing out the lousy arguments of the new atheists. He would be the first to call a foul if Richard Dawkins objected to someone criticizing him based upon their age or the size of their following. So why have these factors suddenly become a big deal when it comes to pointing out the lousy arguments of popular apologists? How come a twenty-something with a small YouTube channel is allowed to point out problems with Richard Dawkins but not with Frank Turek? The double standard is glaring.

Confusions

A little later in the article we get this rather odd statement: “Turek is an excellent apologist, because he is an evangelist. Not a professional philosopher, but an evangelist.” Stockman seems to have missed the fact that an apologist and an evangelist are two different things. The two vocations are compatible and mutually support one another to be sure. But they are distinct and it is possible to be good at one and terrible at the other. Ray Comfort, I think, is an example of someone who is a great evangelist and a terrible apologist. His banana argument for God’s existence is among the worst theistic arguments in history. Comfort doesn’t become a great apologist just because he is a great evangelist, and the same is true of Turek (though I should add that Turek makes a marginally better case for theism than Comfort).

Stockman further claims “Apologetics is about the gospel and equipping Christ’s church, not the academic discussions. It can involve those but it is not reducible to them. I think it a grievous mistake to reduce the Gospel of Christ to one of many items of discussion in the Philosophy of Religion arena.” But this is just clearly wrong. The defense of the Gospel is different than the proclamation of the Gospel. The two certainly work together, but they are absolutely not the same. Apologetics is pre-evangelistic and it is needed more than ever in the modern world. This is why it is so important that our pre-evangelism is done properly because that is what lays the foundation for evangelism. Stockman has, unfortunately, compressed pre-evangelism and evangelism into a single activity. To be very clear, I am not saying that one cannot be both an evangelist and an apologist, nor am I saying that the two tasks cannot be done in the same setting. I merely drawing a conceptual distinction between the two tasks to show that one cannot be reduced to or understood in terms of the other.

At one point, Hess says “These popular apologists have reached hundreds of thousands of people for the cause of Christ, seen many come to Christ, and have inspired others (like yours truly) to get in the game. Yet, these starting apologists will condescend these people (or their followers) with such an air of superiority the message falls entirely flat. What’s even more ironic is these young apologists claim to deal with “the real issues” (suggesting that those like CS Lewis never dealt with real issues), but have been unable to amass any following themselves. The ones who haven’t managed to build a following have a much smaller audience (and therefore influence) on the conversation as a whole. You wanna know why? You guessed it. Nobody cares.”

I think that I speak for all of the young apologists when I say that I am truly thankful for each and every person who has come to Christ because of Frank Turek. No one is disputing that God can work through broken instruments. That’s not the issue. The problems with popular apologetics don’t go away or become insignificant just because popular apologetics has brought many people to Christ.

As to why some of us have smaller followings, Hess claims that this is due to the fact that nobody cares. Perhaps that is true, but that just speaks badly of popular apologists. The fact that you don’t care about objections to your arguments does nothing to reduce their potency. Indeed, to the extent that one cares about popular arguments for Christianity, one might think that they should care about objections to them. Furthermore, it is unclear that our smaller followings are due to apathy as Hess suggests. We are, by definition, young apologists. We haven’t had as much time as someone like Frank Turek has had to amass a large following. Certainly the lack of a following could be due to general apathy towards what we have to say. But it is just as likely to be due to the short amount of time that we have been involved in apologetics. To decide one way or the other, at present, is just premature.

Finally, Hess overlooks the fact that our smaller followings could be due to the fact that we are attempting to soberly and seriously engage with apologetic issues. We aren’t interested in giving the superficially witty, one-line zingers to the questions which skeptics asks us. These sorts of answers are rhetorically powerful. They are great for getting views, likes, shares, and for drawing a following. But they are terrible for actually understanding and answering questions. Perhaps our followings are smaller because we aren’t primarily focused upon building them. As John Hanby correctly says, “One reason Turek or Strobel get more views than Rob Koons, for example, is because quick, witty, over-simplistic, flamboyant ~arguments get more clicks than sober, nuanced, thoughtful, logically airtight sound arguments. This is indicative of Youtube algorithms, and human nature, not indicative of the effectiveness of pop apologetics.”

Irrelevancies

At one point, Hess includes the following bizarre section within the article: ““BUT WHAT ABOUT THE GETTIER PROBLEM!?” … Nobody cares.” No one cares indeed. At least no one cares within the context of the current dispute. So why does Hess bring up such a manifestly irrelevant issue? My best guess is that this has something to do with my passing reference to the Gettier problem in my recent video critiquing Tim Stratton’s freethinking argument (of which Hess is a fan). But even then I only mentioned it briefly because it is relevant to something within Stratton’s argument where the argument touches on epistemology. And believe me, in epistemology, everyone cares about the Gettier problem.

Misunderstandings

Stockman quotes John Hanby as follows: “But there are countless examples who are less popular than Frank Turek, but are better at defending the Christian faith. Joshua Rasmussen, Rob Koons, Eleonore Stump, Alexander Pruss, Joshua Sijuwade, Andrew Loke, Timothy McGrew, and Richard Swinburne are all great places to start.” He then claims that “The claim is that you should start with these. Not gradually work your way up to, but start with.” and draws the conclusion that “All of these names are indeed great thinkers. … But they are (with the possible exception of Rasmussen) horrible places to start. … So why would it be such a bad idea to start with great thinkers? It’s simple: aside from Rasmussen, they have done (practically) nothing at a lay level … The aspiring apologist should start with what they can understand.” Hess understands our grievances in a similar way, saying “Think about it. It’s hard enough to get most Christians today onboard with popular apologetics being a regular part of their churches or conversations, and you want to bring in even more technical stuff?”

So first off, the quotation simply does not say that one must start by reading academic works or even academics. Stockman is just clearly reading more into the quotation than it says. No one is suggesting that the budding apologist should start reading literature which is above their comprehension level. Certainly if one is able to understand academic philosophy, then I think that there is no reason for them to waste their time reading popular material since they are already above that. But if someone is just starting out, our claim is not that they cannot read material on their own level. Rather, the claim is that the material which they read and adopt should be good quality material – not what Frank Turek is offering.

Stockman is correct that there is an unfortunate dearth of good quality entry-level apologetic material. But the solution is surely not to ignore the problems with the existing entry-level apologetic material! The solution is to popularize high quality Christian philosophy which is, in many ways, what we “young apologists” are wanting people like Frank Turek to do. As philosophers like Josh Rasmussen have made clear, it is indeed possible to popularize high quality theistic arguments without incurring the sorts of problems which “young apologists” are identifying in Frank Turek’s arguments. Our claim is not that beginners should begin with high level philosophy. No, our claim is that popularizers should popularize quality material.

Stockman closes this section by saying “I have to either seriously question the humility of these young so-called apologists, or else their self-awareness.” What he should be questioning instead is his reading of our statements or, more precisely, he should be questioning what he is reading into our statements. The bottom line is that no one, to my knowledge, is claiming that beginners should start by reading academic works. The claim is that the popular material is largely poor quality and so there needs to be a popularization of the high quality material. Does Stockman object to this? And if so, why?

Stockman quotes me (albeit not by name) as saying “If seasoned apologists spent more time teaching up-and-coming Christian apologists how to respond to the likes of Graham Oppy, JH Sobel, and Evan Fales, they wouldn’t ever have to bother teaching them how to respond to the likes of Dawkins, Hitchens, and Dillahunty. Showing the flaws in bottom-tier atheist objections to Christianity borders on being a waste of time.” He replies by saying “I talk with skeptics regularly (in person, which is the last thing many of Turek’s detractors do), and “the likes of Graham Oppy, JH Sobel, and Evan Fales” have been mentioned a sum total of never. So why should apologists prepare the younger generation to encounter those arguments?”

Stockman must run in different groups than me since I encounter objections based upon the work of these great atheist philosophers regularly. But in any case, that isn’t the point. The point is that that there is value in learning how to think and knowing that your beliefs can withstand even the most rigorous scrutiny. Apparently this is not all that important to Stockman. His question seems to indicate that one only need know the bare minimum to get by in the encounters which they actually face. At the risk of sounding a bit cynical, it looks like Stockman doesn’t think that knowing Christianity can stand up to even the toughest criticism is valuable for it’s own sake. All that matters is that you can say something in response to the questions you actually get asked. Who care if you have answers to serious objections as long as you never actually meet someone who raises them, right? This is not a posture that I would recommend. It encourages apologists to merely regurgitate answers rather than to be thinkers. And I think that this is the real heart of the matter. Often times, it seems that all popular apologists care about is having a pre-loaded response to objections. To the ‘young apologists’ this communicates a lack of concern for the person making the objection as well as for the subject matter. ‘Young apologists’ are more concerned with teaching people how to think than in teaching them what to think.

Stockman further says “If you are not training to answer the questions and objections you are actually going to face, then you are not training for apologetics. You may be sharpening your thinking, or testing yourself, but it is not apologetics that you are doing.” But Stockman misses the point. The point is that if you are prepared to defend Christianity at the highest levels of intellectual criticism you will, of necessity, be prepared for anything lower than that. The claim is not that one shouldn’t be prepared to answer the bottom tier objections from new atheists. The claim is that if one is prepared to answer the more serious objections, this will also equip them to answer the less serious objections. It’s not either-or. It’s both.

Here we come to, perhaps, the most egregious misunderstanding within the entire article. Stockman refers to this as the heart of the problem with “young apologists.” He again quotes only the last line of the aforementioned quotation from me, and says “Those bottom-tier objections are objections that Christians face. … So, your friend just challenged you on good people suffering. But don’t worry, the apologists are here to help! And they say…showing the flaws in that objection is a waste of time. Your older brother went off to college and heard a professor say that science has removed the need for a God, and now it’s Thanksgiving and he’s an atheist. Answering your brother? A waste of time. Your little sister is hearing at school that she shouldn’t be a Christian because it’s sexually oppressive, and that she should “experiment” and “find” herself? Answering her is a waste of time. These scenarios are all too common, and we all know that, despite these objections being low-hanging fruit, answering them means everything in the world. Why? Because it means everything to the person you are answering. If someone has not grasped the inherit relational nature of apologetics, they should stop speaking on the subject, because they do not know what they are talking about. One does not just answer an objection; they are also answering the person in an effort to till the ground for the gospel.”

I will give Stockman the benefit of the doubt that this is not a deliberate misrepresentation, but it is at the very least a serious misunderstanding. The sentence preceding the statement that “Showing the flaws in bottom-tier objections to Christianity borders on being a waste of time” contextualizes the statement. Before saying that, I had said “If seasoned apologists spent more time teaching up-and-coming Christian apologists how to respond to the likes of Graham Oppy, JH Sobel, and Evan Fales, they wouldn’t ever have to bother teaching them how to respond to the likes of Dawkins, Hitchens, and Dillahunty.” So what is the context of the statement? I am obviously talking about seasoned apologists training budding apologists. I was saying that if you taught Christian apologists how to answer academic atheists then, as a consequence of that teaching, they would then also know how to respond to the bottom-tier objections. I was saying that it is a waste of time to teach upcoming apologists how to answer the new atheists and then to teach them how to answer the philosophical atheists. Why? Because you could kill two birds with one stone as it were by just beginning with the philosophical atheists. That was my point. This should be evident from the context. Moreover Stockman knows that this is the context because he quoted it earlier.

But rather than deal with the point I was actually making, he takes the last sentence out of context and then acts as though I intended to say that under any and all circumstances, it is a waste of time to answer bottom-tier objections to Christianity. I realize that he may not have intended this. Indeed, I hope that he did not. But the fact remains that this is a gross distortion of what I actually said. Let me be very clear: there is nothing wrong with answering lousy objections to Christianity when a critic is raising them against Christianity. However, those who teach others how to do apologetics do them a great disservice if those are the only (or even the primary) kinds of objections which they teach them to anticipate. 

Now let me take this as an opportunity to turn the tables on Stockman. He seems to be saying that we should not be teaching upcoming apologists about the more serious objections to Christianity or, at least, that its not important that they know about them. The problem here is that this can have the same negative results as the ones Stockman was attempting to lecture me over. What happens when you only teach apologists how to deal with bottom-tier objections to Christianity because you (wrongly) think that these are the only objections to Christianity which they will ever encounter, and then they come across real objections from people who have actually thought about this stuff for more than 5 minutes? You’ve given them an illusion that the arguments against Christianity are much weaker than they actually are, and lured them into a false sense of intellectual security. You have set them up for failure. If, on the other hand, we teach apologists how to answer the strongest objections up-front, then they will be totally unfazed by the bottom-tier objections. There is no danger of them coming to feel like apologists tricked them into rejecting a dime-store version of atheism while never dealing with the real thing.

Still later in the article, we find Will Hess saying “I tire of young “would-be-apologists” flippantly putting down popular apologists for casting a wide net and “not going deep enough”. The reality is, their job isn’t to go deep on every topic. Their job is to present the broadest case for Christianity and address the most common objections to Christianity while inviting people to hear the gospel: to be evangelistic.” Like Stockman, Hess has misunderstood the nature of our grievances with popular apologetics. The objection is not that popular apologists “don’t go deep enough.” The objection is that their arguments are often bad. They are frequently not giving people good reasons to believe that Christianity is true, and they are not giving real answers to the arguments against Christianity. The problem is not (necessarily) their level of understanding; it is their content.

Hess also says, “These budding apologists who are upset that J Warner Wallace isn’t responding to Kant’s arguments against miracles or Oppy’s thoughts on Ontological Arguments need to have a serious reality check:” Who is upset about this? Who has made this objection? It looks very much like Hess is attacking a figment of his own imagination here. He goes on to say “Just because someone isn’t interested in a topic that only you and maybe 7 others are interested in doesn’t mean they’re all ignorant chimps.” But again, the objection isn’t that popular apologists aren’t interested in the same topics as we are. It’s that they are speaking on topics for which they have only a surface-level understanding and, consequently, are misrepresenting the issues and options to their audiences.

Hess follows this up by saying “Perhaps, they have simply done enough research in areas to answer their gnawing questions and have since moved on to raise their families, start a business, run a law firm, etc.” But the issue is that they are not merely satisfying their own intellectual curiosity and then moving on. People like Frank Turek are public figures who publicly talk about the case for Christianity. These people need to have a better understanding of the issues than what is needed to answer their own doubts for they are also supposed to be answering the doubts of others. Why is it a bad thing that we would want them to be competent to do that?

Hess also complains that “These popular apologists serve a specific role in the church: to popularize apologetics. To help people overcome the biggest objections to Christianity today and help the masses give themselves permission to believe. They serve as an entryway to the world of apologetics, philosophy, and theology. That’s their role. To expect them to be an expert on textual criticism, theological disputes, epistemology, metaphysics, and history is just wildly unrealistic.” And of course, we “young apologists” completely agree with this! Once again, we want them to popularize good arguments, not crappy arguments. No one is saying that they have to be an expert on everything. Hess is again attacking a figment of his own imagination.

So What Is The Agenda?

Hitherto I’ve pointed out that Stockman and Hess engage in quite a bit a misrepresentation. I trust that this is not deliberate on their part, and likely results from poor communication on the part of so-called “young apologists” as well as poor interpretation on the part of Stockman and Hess. So for the purposes of advancing this conversation in the right direction, let me be very clear about the motivation lying behind many of the criticisms of popular apologetics. The primary motivation is simply faithfulness to the our Lord’s command to do unto others as we would have them do unto us (Lk 6:31, Matt 7:12). Allow me to illustrate.

As someone involved in the world of Christian apologetics, I can’t tell you how many times people ask me to comment on what critics of the faith have to say. As I read their material and watch their content, one problem stands out among the others. There is a lack of familiarity with the full range of options which are open to Christians on certain issues, and there is a lack of engagement with what knowledgeable Christians have written on these subjects. When a skeptic objects that there is huge contradiction between predestination and free will or between foreknowledge and free will in Scripture, I have to roll my eyes. They are just demonstrating that they lack a mature understanding of the Christian faith, and that Christians have many viable options with respect to these issues. When a skeptic brings up the problem of the Canaanite genocide or the problem of evil, but shows no awareness of the diversity of Christian responses to these problems, I tend to stop taking them seriously because they just haven’t done their homework. I call skeptics out for this.

The issue is that the same problem is pervasive among popular Christian apologists. I can’t tell you how many times I see apologists conflating atheism with materialism or assuming that all atheists are logical positivists and moral relativists. I have to roll my eyes when Christian apologists do this because, just like skeptics who fail to understand how broad the Christian tent really is, these apologists are failing to understand how broad the atheist tent is. When an apologist says that atheists can’t account for objective morality, but shows no awareness of robust non-theistic accounts of ethics, I can’t take their claim seriously. They haven’t done their homework and they don’t know what they are talking about. So, to be consistent, I also call apologists out for doing this.

Those of us who are being called “young apologists” don’t want skeptics to attack overly narrow understandings of Christianity or to fail to proportion their confidence to their knowledge of the subject matter. In the same way, we don’t want Christian apologists to attack overly narrow understandings of atheism or to fail to proportion their confidence to their knowledge of the subject matter. This is an attempt to be consistent and to try to take atheism as seriously as we would want atheists to take Christianity. If you don’t like it when atheists attack the most cartoonish versions of Christianity, it’s probably a good idea not to attack the most cartoonish versions of atheism.

Conclusion

Not only have Stockman and Hess failed to justify their thesis that what we are doing is somehow harmful, they also seem to have missed our central concern. We aren’t claiming that nothing can be simplified for a popular audience, we aren’t claiming that budding apologists must start out by reading the works of Richard Swinburne, and we certainly aren’t claiming that it is a waste of time to answer the objections which people actually raise when they raise them. We are simply urging the apologetics community to be consistent, to treat atheism with the same level of respect as we want them to treat Christianity. This requires us, popular apologists included, at a minimum to avoid misrepresenting atheism and to avoid overstating the case for Christianity. That is the issue. If Stockman and Hess want to fight a war with us, they had better start aiming their guns at the actual points we are making instead of shooting high over our heads at claims which no one has made.

And I will close with the eloquent words of John Hanby:

“What often gets lost in consideration of an apologist’s ministry, when one looks at the amount of events, online views, book sales, testimonies, etc. is conversely the amount of people who are negatively impacted. There’s no easy way of measuring success versus failure. I’m reminded that the vast majority of online skeptics or critics of Christianity were former Christians, and a good number of those went to apologetics and were unsatisfied with the answers given. Maybe they were question begging, involved a non-sequitur, or didn’t truly address their underlying worry. I think of Drew from Genetically Modified Skeptic. Of course he’s not the most charitable person, nor does he give the impression of being unbiased, nor does he interact with the best defenders Christianity has to offer, nor does he fully grasp Theistic arguments. However, I imagine if when struggling with doubts in high school or college he had instead encountered Josh Rasmussen, his trajectory would likely be different. I’m reminded of that viral video where an Atheist scientist asks Ravi Zacharias about the Bible being debunked because of Evolution and there being no worldwide flood, and rather than doing the work of answering that involved question, he instead goes on a rant about materialism and quotes a David Berlinski zinger that is great for clips, prestige, and charisma [Christian OWNS Atheist with FACTS and LOGIC] yet leaves a curious skeptic unsatisfied and turned off from the project of Natural Theology.

**This is seriously harmful and not only deserves our attention, but indicates the need for improvement of large parts of popular apologetics. Full stop!**

I’m not saying that all apologists do a bad job. I think many popular apologists do a wonderful job. And criticizing pop-apologetics is not even most of what these “young apologists” do. I don’t even have one of these channels that nobody watches. David Pallmann has provided a systematic Wesleyan exegesis of various passages of the Bible, a ton of work on epistemology, the Synoptic problem, Gospel Reliability, and Intelligent Design. Christian Idealism has a bunch of content on Bayesian Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind, Models of God, and with the help of Tim Howard and Josh Rasmussen developed an entire argument/explanatory framework for Theism on the basis of Unification. The scholarly discussions Than of Exploring Reality hosts on his channel, along with all the various objections to Christianity and Theism he engages speaks for itself. So this idea that Young Apologists have some unhealthy occupation with the apologetics they disagree with is false.”

Note: This is an extended version of an essay I wrote for my philosophy of law course in college. I do not intend to defend or critique the morality of abortion but rather that from a legal philosophy perspective it is clear that the courts decision to overturn Roe V. Wade was based on the Legal Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart and by assuming his legal theory, Roe was doomed from the start

By: Kyle Alander

Doobs vs Jackson was a Supreme Court decision overturning Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood. The decision of the Court was controversial and many wanted to blame the bias of the pro-life judges who dominated the court. However, I will argue that it was the philosophy of legal positivism developed by Hart that ultimately brought about the decision to declare abortion as not protected by the Constitution. Roe held that the abortion rights are part of a right to privacy that springs from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Casey Court then further made its declaration solely on the theory that the right to obtain an abortion is part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Doobs v. Jackson did not find the arguments for this persuasive for a variety of reasons but I will focus on the underlying philosophy.

Before we get into why the court made the right decision assuming the truth of legal positivism I want to address a fundamental objection that people may bring up. Some may object to my analysis on the basis that I have not responded to the dissenting court’s arguments in this essay. However, arguments are dependent on theories in my view and when it comes to court cases, an argument only comes after one’s legal philosophy. So legal arguments only work in the context of the underlying logic of a specific legal theory. In this sense one has to assume a certain legal tradition prior to forming legal arguments. A legal argument cannot be divorced from a legal philosophy. With these considerations it is important that we examine the underlying legal philosophy and legal systems as a whole when investigating these sorts of disputes. For the purposes of this essay, I will be assuming Hart’s legal positivism as a given and apply it to this court case.

H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism, fundamentally differentiates law from morality, arguing that a law’s validity stems from its adherence to established legal rules, not moral standards. Central to his theory is the ‘rule of recognition,’ a higher-order rule that helps identify valid laws within a legal system, thereby distinguishing legal directives from other social norms. Hart categorizes legal rules into ‘primary’ (directives of conduct for the populace) and ‘secondary’ (rules governing the creation and interpretation of primary rules). He also emphasizes the ‘internal point of view,’ where members of a society internalize and accept legal rules as legitimate standards. Although acknowledging judicial discretion in ‘hard cases,’ Hart insists this should align with the legal system’s principles. His philosophy underscores the autonomy of legal systems and clarifies the structured nature of judicial decision-making. With this theory in the background, let’s see how this shapes the abortion case.

First is that abortion is (i) not mentioned in constitutional law, (ii) was not passed federally in a legislative body at any point in the history of the legal system, and therefore has zero legal precedence within a positivist framework. To support (i) I claim that constitutional law requires a right to be either explicit or implicit. The Constitution does not clearly state an abortion is a right explicitly in the text. Thus any inference that the constitution lays out a right can only be implicit. However, even implicitly it is doubtful whether it states this. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments are the only possible places it can be implicit. The First Amendment makes no implicit reference to anything to do with abortion, the Fourth Amendment only applies to unreasonable searches and seizures of property or identity and nothing to do with the reproductive system. The Fifth Amendment only applies to criminal procedures to individuals who were accused of a crime, the ninth amendment is used as a reference to the right of privacy and, finally, the fourteenth amendment is used as a reference to the due process clause.

For the right of privacy argument, there are two responses, first Roe’s privacy argument relied on equating the right to shield information from disclosure and the right to make a personal decision of abortion without governmental interference. The two are not the same and without further clarification by the law on what the right to privacy entails, it is doubtful that the privacy argument works. Second, it drew an arbitrary line in the viability of the fetus such that the “right of privacy” would be arbitrarily cut off at some time. The Roe court decision did not justify its trimester schema of when the right to privacy would be present and then disappear once the fetus had reached a certain development. We now turn our attention to the due process clause argument from Casey. Here my response is that due process only applies to criminal legal proceedings. The entire logic of Casey only works if the logic of Roe works and the Casey court did not add any new arguments for why abortion is constitutional independent of the privacy argument provided in Roe.

With this in mind in support of (ii) there is no point in history where abortion was passed as a legal right in any legislative bill and it does not fit the United States legal traditions. So Abortion was never essential to this Nation’s schema of liberty. Therefore since all arguments for legal precedence have been refuted there is no mention of abortion either explicitly or implicitly in the constitution and therefore the court went too far in declaring it a right without a legislative body.

Building up my case first, since abortion is not in the constitution then it should be contingent on the states until there is federal legislative support. This is important since a fundamental rule in legal positivism is the rule of recognition. Any federal laws on abortion must be recognized by a federal legislative body. But it has not been recognized as such and thus violates the rule of recognition. Hence the states should have the right to pass laws and enforce them since state rights and decisions on criminal matters clearly do have legal precedence in the legal system. Secondly, Roe and Casey extended the law beyond what the purpose of the law was. This is where pedigree is important to take into account. The pedigree of a legal rule is linked to its historical development, social acceptance, and recognition within the legal system. It is argued that Dobbs v. Jackson was based on pedigree since abortion is a penumbral case and this is where pedigree becomes important. The positivism of Hart takes the idea of pedigree as an application of family resemblances, here one must stay consistent with legal precedence and not invent new rules that are not valid by the rule of recognition. And in the case of abortion, there is zero legal precedence for it as it is not explicitly or implicity in the constitution and was not passed by legislation. Therefore given pedigree the Roe court went too far as it wasn’t something that passed the criteria of recognition.

Now one counter-argument to my entire case is that abortion is precisely a penumbral case, as the writers of the constitution didn’t have abortion in mind as a right and so morality should play a role in the legality of abortion. Hence the legal question is reduced to the moral question and since the court cannot make moral decisions assuming legal positivism then they should have kept Roe as valid until the moral question was answerable by the ethicist. Here I offer three lines of response.

The first is that the pro-life view of the morality of abortion could be correct and therefore we ought to have made abortion illegal if we are to use morality in such a penumbral case. We cannot just assume the pro-choice side is correct on the moral question. Second, while it is a penumbral case it still requires the rule of recognition to be a valid law which it clearly does not satisfy. There is no federal legal precedence for abortion access since state and federal law need to be separate under the United States legal system. Finally and perhaps the biggest issue at hand is that concepts like “liberty” do not have a well-defined robust recognition. Any and all rights and liberties not explicit in the Constitution serve as penumbral cases, should we then make morality be the deciding factor in all of them? In positivism, the moral implications are quite secondary. The new penumbral case must resemble older cases in order for morality to play any role. However, abortion is (i) morally controversial and so doesn’t deserve to be settled on purely moral grounds and (ii) doesn’t share any family resemblance to previous cases dealing with rights and liberties even if we take the case as not having any moral implications.

In Summary, there is no legal precedence for abortion in federal law or the Constitution. This implies that Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood both violated the rule of recognition and therefore within a positivist legal framework the decision of Doobs vs Jackson to overturn these cases was correct. Attempts to argue that abortion is a penumbral case and therefore should be decided on moral grounds do not work given that abortion is (i) a controversial moral issue and so doesn’t deserve the same moral privilege as previous decisions made about liberties and rights and (ii) abortion does not share any family resemblances to previous cases involving the concept of “liberty” and so pedigree does not extend far enough to include abortion as a right to be had in the federal legal system.

Note: This was the very first philosophy paper I wrote as a semester final in community college. It was in my introduction to philosophy course that I took back in 2021. So while I agree with what is said in this paper it is far far inferior to the methodology I now adopt, one can learn a lot in 2 years. Anyways even though I don’t fully endorse the methodology and arguments employed here I still want to share it. Enjoy! 

By: Kyle Alander

Theism vs Naturalism

I will propose a way to make progress on the question of God’s existence. I will begin by laying out limitations of traditional approaches in terms of giving deductive or inductive arguments for or against the existence of God. Then I will show the problems with framing theism as if it is adding into naturalistic commitments. Finally, I will seek to show that theism enjoys certain theoretical virtues that naturalist rivals lack. My purpose is not to decisively show that theism is true, but to illustrate a strategy for making progress on this big question about the ultimate nature of reality.

There are many different kinds of arguments that have been offered for and against the existence of God. Arguments for the existence of God come in the following classification; ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, teleological arguments, moral arguments and variations of other arguments. Arguments against the existence of God comes in the following classification: arguments from evil, arguments from divine hiddenness and variations of other arguments. While there are many arguments for and against the existence of God, they all have limitations. One popular argument for God is the Kalam cosmological argument. But this argument in all its versions all rely on causal finitism which is a metaphysical assumption about the impossibility of causal infinities (Malpass, Wes Moriston 2020) .

Furthermore, the Aristotelian proof or Aquinas’s five ways rely on many background assumptions related to the metaphysical systems they operate in. They would not work if something like existential inertia is true according to which concrete temporal objects tend to persist in existence without requiring an existential sustaining cause (Oppy 2019; Schmid 2020) . The arguments only work in the context of their metaphysics. One has to establish these metaphysical systems are correct before we can make a successful argument for God. The same is true for arguments against God. Arguments from evil operate on utilitarian and consequentialist assumptions (Reitan 2000). They cannot be divorced from a normative ethical theory of what God should do as it relates to evil. Arguments from evil would not work under an agent-based theory of normative ethics (Zagzebski 1996) . We need to establish a normative ethical theory in order to make a successful argument against God. 

With these considerations it is important that we examine the metaphysical and ethical systems as a whole when investigating these sorts of philosophical disputes. We should make a comparative assessment of our best theories using simplicity, fitness with data, explanatory scope, predictive power and so on (Oppy 2015). Theoretical virtues can be subsumed into two basic principles; Simplicity and Explanatory power. With Simplicity there is Syntactic Simplicity and Ontological Simplicity. 

The philosopher Graham Oppy presents a cumulative argument against God using Ontological Simplicity . He argues that theism includes all of the commitments of naturalism but adds additional supernatural commitments to it (Oppy 2014). By contrast, the philosopher Richard Swinburne uses more of Syntactical Simplicity to argue that Theism explains everything with one fundamental entity, whereas Naturalism has more complexity (Swinburne 2004) . We need to begin to compare the best version of Theism against the best competitive version of Naturalism.

To lay out a Theistic theory it’s important to start off with God’s ultimate nature so we can understand its implications. God’s ultimate nature would be ideal or absolute perfection. Ideal perfection would have the greatest concentration of purely positive qualities such as limitless value. From this we can deduce all of the particular perfections. One core simple property of absolute perfection can deduce the other perfections such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence and so forth. God’s attributes are all derived from ideal perfection that is simple at its foundational core. 

On the other side we have Naturalism. On naturalism all that exists is natural causal entities and powers. A Naturalism that precludes Theism would claim that reality is made of fundamental mindless matter and we are just arrangements of such matter. Consciousness would be produced by the brain and moral facts may or may not be objective. If there are objective moral facts or duties we may say that they are necessary truths. Which means they cannot be false in any possible world. While not all versions of Naturalism preclude Theism the ones that do are what we should compare to Theism. The main difference between Theism and Naturalism, then, is that Theism has ideal perfection as the foundation to reality whereas Naturalism has imperfection as the foundation. 

To begin our comparison I first dispute that theism is adding to naturalistic commitments. Consider that naturalism posits fundamental imperfection (or an infinite chain of dependent things). This posit adds complexity and bruteness to naturalism (Leftow 2017). If fundamental reality is whatever physics says (whether particles, fields or some initial state), then even if there is an infinite chain of these things it is a brute fact that such things exist. 

To reply, a naturalist might appeal to necessity. Perhaps instead of supposing that some imperfection is brute, we could explain the fundamental imperfection in terms of its necessary existence. However, I don’t think this reply works because it only pushes the bruteness back a step: we can now ask why do such things exist necessarily?

Theism, by contrast, provides a way to eliminate brute necessities. For ideal perfection would entail necessary existence, since necessary existence is a particular perfection. In this way, ideal perfection has an internal nature that can explain its own necessity given its ideal perfection. By contrast there’s nothing about the internal nature of some imperfect foundation that would explain its own necessary existence (Byerly 2019) . On naturalism, it is simply a brute fact that things exist, or naturalism is left with unexplained necessities. Theism has a foundational explanation and so it gets rid of fundamental bruteness and provides more explanatory depth

Second, consider that Naturalism posits natural objects. However, the naturalist has to specify that these objects are mind-independent and beyond our immediate experience. We have direct awareness of experience, but not a world beyond experience (Kastrup 2018). The Theist can shave these off by holding to an idealistic ontology of mental monism where only experience exists. A world of just experience is compatible with an external world as long as the things you experience only exist in someone’s experience which can be personal experience or trans-personal experience (Kastrup 2017). Instead of posting some brute world beyond and independent from experience or posting fundamental unexplained necessities we can explain necessities and shave off all mind-independent objects to stick with an experiential ontology on theism. 

These considerations help to turn the tables in the comparison of naturalism vs theism. Instead of adding God to the physical universe we are instead simplifying the foundations of reality by getting rid of brute facts to provide explanatory depth and shaving off the mindless matter of a world beyond experience. It seems that theism and naturalism have totally different conceptions of the universe but in final count theism has the simpler conception when we only have an experiential ontology to the universe. 

Finally, consider that we want a hypothesis that explains the most with the least. On naturalism you can have the explanatory scope needed to account for facts of the world without God. These facts include logic, mathematics, consciousness, fine tuning, morality, religious experience and awareness expanding adventures. However if they do so with a naturalism that precludes theism then they will add fundamental complexity to the theory. They may posit an abundance of different necessities or separated explanations to explain things like logic, morality and fine tuning. 

Theism on the other hand can explain all of these by one fundamentally perfect necessity. Ideal perfection entails perfect goodness which serves as the moral foundation of all moral principles. Ideal perfection entails perfect knowledge which serves as the foundation of all principles of reason and mathematics. Ideal perfection entails perfect power which serves as the resources to create a world suitable for other minds which can have their own personal experiences to build identities. Ideal perfection successfully explains everything relevant to its own ontology since it internally has the resources to explain its own necessary existence as well as logical, mathematical and moral truths. Theism has the simple unification needed to explain the most with the least and does not require separated explanations since all aspects of reality converge into a single perfect source 

In summary, all arguments for and against God rely on prior metaphysical theories and so we should employ theoretical virtues and compare such metaphysical theories. My conclusion is that Theism as a metaphysical theory beats Naturalism on at least these grounds: (i) eliminates all brute facts and thus has more explanatory depth, (ii) provides the simplest conception of the universe, and (iii) provides a more unified account of all necessary truths. This of course does not settle the debate on God’s existence but my goal is to have pointed out the theoretical virtues that favor theism against naturalism. 

Works cited

Byerly, T Ryan. “From a Necessary Being to a Perfect Being.” Analysis, vol. 79, no. 1, 2018, pp. 10–17., doi:10.1093/analys/any009. 

 Kastrup, Bernardo. “An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophies, vol. 2, no. 4, 2017, p. 10., doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010.

Kastrup, Bernardo. “Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy.” Academia.edu, 2018, http://www.academia.edu/37049147/Conflating_Abstraction_with_Empirical_Observation_The_False_Mind_Matter_Dichotomy.

LEFTOW, BRIAN. “A Naturalist Cosmological Argument.” Religious Studies, vol. 53, no. 3, 2017, pp. 321–338., doi:10.1017/s0034412517000257.

Malpass, Alex, and Wes Morriston. “Endless and Infinite.” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 281, 2020, pp. 830–849., doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa005.

Oppy, G. Best Argument against God. Palgrave Pivot, 2014.

OPPY, GRAHAM. “On Stage One of Feser’s ‘Aristotelian Proof.’” Religious Studies, 2019, pp. 1–12., doi:10.1017/s0034412519000568. 

OPPY, GRAHAM. “What Derivations Cannot Do.” Religious Studies, vol. 51, no. 3, 2015, pp. 323–333., doi:10.1017/s0034412515000256.

Reitan, Eric. “Does the Argument from Evil Assume a Consequentialist Morality? – Volume 17, Issue 3, July 2000.” Faith and Philosophy, 16 Apr. 2021, http://www.pdcnet.org/faithphil/content/faithphil_2000_0017_0003_0306_0319.

Schmid, Joseph C. “Existential Inertia and the Aristotelian Proof.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2020, doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09773-9. 

Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. Clarendon Press, 2004. 

Zagzebski, Linda. “An Agent-Based Approach to the Problem of Evil.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 39, no. 3, 1996, pp. 127–139., doi:10.1007/bf00136244. 

By: Kyle Alander

I recently listened to a discussion between Ben Shapiro and Alex O Connor on whether religion is good for society. I thought the discussion was overall balanced and helpful. I will write a later post about my full thoughts on the issue. However, at the beginning of the discussion, Alex decided to discuss free will with Ben and he brought forward an interesting objection that I wish to answer here. While I have defended free will elsewhere this argument from Alex is not part of my defense. Hence I will treat this argument as new and so worthy of response.

Alex O’Connor’s argument against free will can be formulated as a logical dilemma, focusing on the nature of the self and its decisions. Hence it does not rely on any view about the nature of the mind and the brain (something that I found helpful)

Here’s a structured formulation:

1. Alex’s Question: Is the self determined or undetermined?

2. Case 1 – Undetermined Self:
– Assertion: If the self is undetermined, then its actions and decisions are random.
– Conclusion: If actions are random, the individual cannot be in control of them.

3. Case 2 – Determined Self:
– Sub-Question: If the self is determined, is it determined by internal or external factors?
– Case 2A – External Determination:
– Assertion: If determined by external factors, the individual is not in control of those factors.
– Conclusion: Therefore, the individual is not in control of the self.
– Case 2B – Internal Determination:
– Assertion: If determined by internal factors, we must inquire what determines these internal factors.
– Recursive Question: Is the determinant of the internal factors itself determined or undetermined?
– Conclusion: This leads back to the original dilemma (step 1), creating an infinite regress.

4. Overall Conclusion: In either case (undetermined or determined), the individual lacks control over the self, challenging the concept of free will.

This formulation demonstrates a logical progression, examining each possibility (undetermined or determined) and its implications, ultimately leading to the conclusion that free will is problematic under either scenario. Based on the questions that Alex asked Ben this I believe is the best formulization of his argument.

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Response:

Drawing from Peter Tse’s concept of second-order free will or metafree will one can offer a nuanced critique of Alex O’Connor’s argument against free will. Here’s how it specifically addresses and potentially dismantles parts of O’Connor’s argument:

Peter Tse describes another kind of free will which he calls second order free will or meta-free will

“Finally, it is not enough to simply have the ‘first-order free will’ afforded by the above kind of nervous system that can choose actions freely. Only if present choices can ultimately lead to a chooser becoming a new kind of chooser — that is, only if there is second-order free will or metafree will — do brains have the capacity to both have chosen otherwise, and to have meta-chosen otherwise. Only such a metafree will allows a brain to not only choose among options available now, but to cultivate and create new types of options for itself in the future that are not presently open to it . Only then can there be responsibility for having chosen to become a certain kind of person who chooses from among actions consistent with being that kind of person.” Dr. Peter Tse

Given this view this challenges Alex’s argument on several fronts:

1. Beyond the Binary of Determined/Undetermined:
– O’Connor’s argument hinges on a binary framework: the self is either determined or undetermined. Tse’s concept challenges this by introducing a more complex model where decision-making is not strictly binary but involves a dynamic interplay of factors.
– The idea of cultivating criteria and developing metafree will suggests that the self can evolve and shape its own decision-making criteria over time, which goes beyond the simple dichotomy of determined or undetermined.

2. Internal Determinism Revisited:
– O’Connor argues that if the self is determined by internal factors, it leads to an infinite regress. However, Tse’s model suggests that this internal determination is not a simple linear process but involves an active, conscious shaping of one’s future decision-making framework.
– This approach counters the idea of an infinite regress by suggesting that the brain’s capacity to evolve and create new decision-making criteria is a form of self-determination, not merely a reaction to pre-existing conditions.

3. Introduction of Dependent Determinism:
– O’Connor’s framework doesn’t seem to consider dependent determinism, where decisions are influenced by criteria that the individual actively cultivates. This type of determinism implies a form of agency that is missing from O’Connor’s dichotomy.
– In this model, the self is neither entirely controlled by external factors nor trapped in an infinite regress of internal factors. Instead, it actively engages in shaping its decision-making environment.

4. Addressing the Control Issue:
– O’Connor contends that if actions are random or determined by external factors, the individual lacks control. The concept of metafree will suggests a form of control that emerges from the individual’s capacity to shape future decision-making criteria and paths.
– This kind of control is neither purely random nor entirely pre-determined; it’s a product of the individual’s ongoing engagement with their own cognitive processes and their environment.

Here’s a deeper look into Peter Tses ideas:

1. Second-Order Free Will or Metafree Will:
– Tse argues that the brain’s ability to choose is not limited to immediate options; it extends to shaping future choices and creating new possibilities.
– This “second-order” free will means the brain can change the kind of chooser it is, thus expanding or altering the range of choices available in the future.
– It’s about the brain’s capacity not only to make choices based on current circumstances but also to influence and change its own decision-making framework over time.

2. Neural Basis of Free Will:
– Tse’s approach is grounded in neuroscience. He suggests that the neural mechanisms in the brain are not strictly deterministic in a classical sense. Instead, they allow for the emergence of new patterns and connections, which in turn lead to new types of choices and behaviors.
– He emphasizes the importance of neural plasticity – the brain’s ability to change and adapt – in facilitating this kind of free will.

3. Cultivating Criteria:
– In Tse’s view, every decision and action influences the brain’s future decision-making processes. By choosing certain paths, the brain effectively ‘cultivates’ certain criteria or values, which then inform future choices.
– This cultivation of criteria is a dynamic process, wherein the individual is not just a passive recipient of external influences but actively shapes their own cognitive and decision-making landscape.

4. Agency and Responsibility:
– Tse’s model implies a heightened sense of agency and responsibility. Since individuals have the capacity to shape their future selves through their choices, they bear responsibility for the kind of person they become.
– This view counters arguments that free will is an illusion due to deterministic or random processes, suggesting instead that individuals play a crucial role in their own self-development.

5. Critique of Traditional Determinism:
– Traditional determinism posits that all events are the result of preceding causes. Tse challenges this by proposing that the brain can function in a way that is not entirely predetermined by past states.
– His concept of free will suggests a more complex interplay between determinism, randomness, and conscious choice, where the brain’s capacity for self-modification plays a central role.

6. Implications for Consciousness and Selfhood:
– Tse’s theory also has significant implications for our understanding of consciousness and the self. It suggests that selfhood is a dynamic, ever-evolving process, shaped by our continuous engagement with our choices and their consequences.

In essence, Peter Tse’s view of free will is a unique model of free will that is more complex and interactive than traditional deterministic or indeterministic models, emphasizing the brain’s unique capacity for self-modification and the cultivation of decision-making criteria.

In summary, the response based on Peter Tse’s concept challenges the foundational assumptions of O’Connor’s argument by introducing a more complex understanding of free will. It suggests that free will can exist as a sophisticated interplay of evolving criteria, conscious decision-making, and the capacity to shape one’s future self, which goes beyond the simplistic binary of determined versus undetermined. This I believe puts to rest Alex’s argument

For more on Peter Tse, see: “Two types of libertarian free will are realized in the human ….” https://www.dartmouth.edu/~peter/pdf/C12.pdf.

Note: This post is taken originally from something I wrote as part of the worldview design training center. I have decided to take what I have written their and put it in this blog. Enjoy! 

By: Kyle Alander

One of the most heated debates among Christians is how we are too see evolution. Some deny evolution and hold to a young universe (young earth creationist) . Some deny evolution and hold to an old universe (old earth creationism). 

There are those who lean towards a traditional understanding of evolutionary history but think that God must have supernaturally intervened in much of the events in that history. This can either be those that hold to intelligent design theory or those that hold to some variation of evolutionary creationism that requires divine intervention within certain events. So while one can hold a traditional view of the evolutionary history there are many events in that history that require supernatural intervention. 

Then there is what I will term *deistic evolution* where God just sets up the initial conditions and lets everything play out on its own. So God is sustaining the universe but is not responsible for much other things. The entire evolutionary history on this account is a totally natural process and nature is mindless and follows strict physical laws. 

Here I want to step back and look at the underlying assumptions being made in these views. While I do lean more towards theistic evolution (since I deny intelligent design theory and I accept the traditional evolutionary story of life on Earth) I have a new option that is consistent with a Christian understanding of nature rather than deism:

If Christians are too hold a view that rejects intelligent design theory and hold that evolution doesn’t require constant divine intervention and NOT commit themselves to deistic evolution I think Christians will need to change their views not on evolution but on their philosophy of nature

(1) Philosophy of Nature

Philosophy of nature asks about what is nature fundamentally? Here are two options: 

1. Nature is a blind and mindless machine that strictly obeys physical laws 

2. Nature is a cognitive and mental process that has intelligence built into it

Most scientists including Christians who hold to intelligent design or hold to a divine interventionist view of evolutionary creationism, and the neo-darwinist and the deistic evolutionist assume the first option. The idea of a mental aspect to nature is something that most scientists (of every persuasion) don’t generally consider. Nature is thought to obey rules (physical laws) mindlessly and strictly. And this assumption is held by people of all sides of the evolutionary controversy.

Those who hold to intelligent design or some variation of evolutionary creationism that requires divine intervention will assume without justification that nature is inherently mindless and non-intelligent and so assume that we need an external intelligent designer in order to account for the intelligence found in biological systems. 

(2) The novel approach to evolution

My view is to take the second option: Nature is a cognitive and mental process that has intelligence built into it

Taking this approach on the philosophy of nature bypasses a lot of issues. The Christian can say that God sustains a universe that has cognition already built into it (not human cognition but the type similar to plants). Taking this approach would bypass the intelligent design objections against evolution because they presuppose that nature doesn’t inherently have intelligence built into it. However if nature does have intelligence built into it then one does not require an intelligent design theory to account for this. If God created a universe that already has cognition built into it then one can be consistent with the idea that evolution was the total byproduct of nothing but natural processes and that natural processes themselves are cognitive and intelligent. As soon as we deny that nature is fundamentally mindless then that opens the door for an intelligent creation that can produce things on God’s behalf without God needing to do constant divine interventions. 

While intelligent design theorists are correct in that you cannot get intelligence from non-intelligence (or cognition from non-cognition). The intelligent design theorist are forgetting that if one’s philosophy of nature includes the fact that nature is itself intelligent and cognitive then that will explain the data that intelligent designers appeal to when trying to support their theory.

And so it is my view that God creating a universe that has cognition built into it and therefore can evolve intelligently on its own is more likely than God creating a mindless universe that requires constant divine intervention. It really comes down to one’s philosophy of nature. 

Conclusion

If nature is fundamentally mindless then it is expected that one will not be able to explain consciousness nor will they be able to explain the intelligence within biological systems. However if nature is fundamentally mental and cognitive then one will be able to explain the data of consciousness and intelligent biological systems within a theistic evolutionary framework.