Response to derezzed 83 on quantum idealism

This blog is a response to this video:  https://youtu.be/B9Rn3mHw6QU 

So derezzed 83 has made a video about why he does not favor quantum idealism so me and Johanan Raatz have teamed up and made a response to him. The first part will be Johanan Raatz criticism with a few points that I built on then I will provide my own criticism.

Johanan Raatz criticism with a few points built on:  

  • At the beginning of the video Derezzed says that I use the delayed-choice quantum eraser as evidence for idealism. I actually do not. However I do use it as evidence against materialism as it is intrinsically non-realist. Of course non-realism strongly suggests idealism but it is not even the best evidence suggesting idealism. For that we would have to look to emergent spacetime, wherein the physical spacetime realm of matter emerges from immaterial information outside of spacetime. Given that information is uniquely mental in nature, this would entail idealism.

    Secondly the delayed-choice quantum eraser is simply not compatible with Bohmian mechanics as stated in the video, as otherwise the experimenters choices would be determined years in advance, and that is not compatible with either the practice of science or the existence of free-will.

    Thirdly, even though one could perhaps say the delayed-choice quantum eraser is compatible with dualism this has three problems:

1.) It does not explain the non-realism in the delayed-choice quantum eraser (and idealism does) as such dualism does not predict the delayed-choice quantum eraser even if it is compatible with it. (which is dubious itself)

2.) It explains less (it does not account for non-realism) and uses more assumptions to do so (dualism assumes two substances whereas idealism only assumes one).

3.) Though the delayed-choice quantum eraser does not prove idealism itself, it does eliminate the second substance held by dualists, namely matter. So the question I would ask to Derezzed is, if you are a dualist, and matter has been falsified as a possible substance, what is your second substance?

4) Dualism contradicts all the evidence we have for a simulated universe and contradicts quantum gravity research since all of the evidence points toward a simulated universe.(Read my other blog where I lay out some of that evidence) https://christianidealism.wordpress.com/2017/08/20/understanding-objective-idealismpart-3-quantum-gravity-and-the-simulated-universe/

  • Now when we come to the first critique Derezzed gives of the philosophic case we find that it is based on two misunderstandings. Derezzed argues that the Chinese Room refutes the idea of quantum information being consciousness.

    In response, the information processing in the Chinese room is purely syntactic. However no one said that the quantum information needed to be purely syntactic. In fact I, and others such as Penrose, hold that it is semantic as well. Secondly, you are confusing an activity (information processing) with a thing (information). We did not claim information processing comprises consciousness, but that the information itself (such as ideas and percepts) is (bits of) consciousness.

 

  • As for the second critique of the philosophic case given. The position critiqued is simply my position.It’s an entirely different position Derezzed has apparently mistakenly assumed to be mine, which he then critiques:

    He argues that “information about quantum events is insufficient to deduce information about mental experiences.”

    This is not my position. I never said information about quantum events (assumed to be third person here it seems) provides or allows one to deduce first person subjective experiences, nor in any of my videos (Johanan Raatz videos) did I say anything about “information about quantum events.” What I’m saying is the quantum information is the first person subjective experience itself. This is evident in such things as von Neumann chains terminating in subjective perceptions. The product of the collapse is the subjective perception itself. Here, Derezzed should also note that this would even be true on the dualistic view of wavefunction collapse that he holds to.

 

  • As Derezzed’s critique of how properties are defined in the interaction problem, that is just how properties are defined in science. Charge as a property for instance is a rigid designator to denote the interaction between electrons and protons and other particles. You may say that this is a scientific definition and not a philosophical one. However insofar as electrons and protons also have ontological substance they are also philosophical objects as well as scientific ones. Thus properties they have are philosophic as well as scientific.

    Taking this line of reasoning further, if on a dualistic view of the world an immaterial soul were to interact with a material electron, we could measure the effect it has on the electron, and thus deduce from that interaction the electric charge the soul must have. However now you have a conundrum. The soul has a property that has traditionally been ascribed only to physical objects. So if that is the case then there is no way to tell if say an electron is a physical object or a non-physical one, if other objects that are non-physical such as souls have properties like electric charge as well. And as we have said before if the universe is a simulation then dualism is false since matter would not really exist as a mind-independent thing anyway.

 

  • Next Derezzed references red as a property that does not entail interaction. This is an equivocation fallacy though. Yes red is a property, however it is not the kind of property we are referring to when we speak of things interacting. Furthermore, even so on the paradigm of dualism, immaterial objects would not have properties such as redness. So you’re using that as an example would only further illustrate that the red objects are both of the same physical substance, even if they are not interacting.
  • Next Derezzed makes the following statement:

    “…there’s not one shared property we can point to which is required for causation to occur…”

    This is simply false. We know of plenty of properties that are required for various interactions; mass, charge, color charge etc. As for him citing entanglement as an example of propertyless causation, entanglement does not actually produce instantaneous causation but instantaneous correlation. If it did entail instantaneous causation it would transmit information faster than light in violation of relativity. Rather in entanglement, the collapse of a joint wavefunction happens instantly for both particles, and the correlated states of both are then simultaneously determined. Furthermore, even if it was instantaneous causation, treating the intervening space as though it was not there, this wouldn’t make sense in a dualistic mind-independent reality where space is a real thing either.
  • Lastly Derezzed raises a theological objection that is easily resolved by the Energies/Essence distinction. He argues that if God’s mind contains other minds with evil thoughts, that that then makes God evil.
     
    This does not follow though. God’s mind (His essence) containing other minds with evil thoughts (in His energies), does not make God evil anymore than Tolkien’s mind containing Sauron, makes Tolkien evil.

Main Blogger’s criticism: I will now present my criticism of his video.

The first point is the delayed-choice quantum eraser and if it favors idealism. Well I would first agree that idealism and some forms of dualism do favor it over materialism but the plot wave theory you mentioned can be ruled out by violating relativity and failing as a potential candidate for quantum gravity. You can see other problems with plot wave here http://settheory.net/Bohm

Also as I have been doing my series on understanding quantum idealism I show how and why idealistic interpretations are the only logical way forward. I’m not done with the series yet but so far if you check other post from this blog you will see why idealism is the only way forward. So your claim that we lack scientific evidence is refuted by the evidence. And there are some versions of bohmian mechanics that are compatible with idealism.

The second point is a misunderstanding. Classical information cannot be semantics but quantum information can be since qubits can hold more information than classical bits. And not only that but integrated information would be consciousness and not just information processing. I agree consciousness is more than just information processing but it would be integrated information.

Next your response to the interaction problem is not good. If there are two substances and if they interact then one of them must have a property that can logically relate to it. Also the color red is purely mental so using an analogy only shows mental substance and not physical substance. You never actually see, taste, smell or hear matter or physical substance only its perception so then there your objection against the interaction problem doesn’t work .

Finally with privatio boni evil would exist as an absence of good and not be a thing itself so this objection does not work since evil would be a distortion of the creation rather than an actual thing that exist. And you logically cannot deny privatio boni without saying good and evil don’t exist so if good and evil do exist then evil would be an absence of good.

P1) It is logically impossible for someone to be evil just for the sake of being evil

P2) If it’s logically impossible for someone to be evil just to be evil then it’s logically impossible for evil to exist in its own

C1: Evil cannot exist eternally on its own

P3) If it’s logically impossible for evil to exist on its own then evil is a perversion of good

P4) If evil is a perversion of good then only good can exist on its own

C2) Only good can exist eternally on its own

Final conclusion: Therefore evil is the absence of Good (which implies privatio boni)

Now of course the only way to refute the argument would be to somehow refute the first premise but it is logically impossible for someone to be evil just for the sake of being evil in reality we have no experience of someone being evil just to be evil the closest we can get is cruelty but in reality people are only cruel to gain something. Such as power, pleasure or safety but these are not evil they are good to have the evil comes from pursuing them in the wrong motives or in the wrong way. When you examine it evil is nothing more than the pursuit of something good in the wrong way. Now unlike evil you can be good just for the sake of being good you can do a kind act even if it gives you no pleasure simply because it is the right thing to do but no one can be cruel just for being cruel or be cruel without gaining something good. Let’s have C.S. lewis explain “In other words, badness cannot succeed even in being bad in the same way in which goodness is good… Goodness is so to speak itself: badness is only spoiled goodness. And there must be something good first before it can be spoiled.” -C.S. Lewis.” so we can see that the first premise is true and to argue otherwise will result in logical absurdities thus the conclusion is inevitable.  

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